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Abstract
This note documents trends of socialization and intergenerational
mobility across research networks (fields) in economics. Using data
on advisor-advisee pairs, we find that intergenerational field similarity
is more prevalent in larger and successful fields. We then show that
researchers who do choose different fields than those of their advisors are
more likely to switch to highly demanded fields in the job market. These
results are consistent with the equilibrium of a model in which advisors’
have concerns for their advisees’ socialization and production outcomes.
We also document a positive relation between field productivity and the
median level of co-authorship at the field level, which is consistent with
complementaries between socialization and productive efforts.
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1 Introduction
In this note, we document trends in intergenerational field mobility in eco-
nomics using the RePEc Genealogy project, which connects individual re-
searchers with their PhD advisors. Advisees choose their advisors matching
their own interests and abilities (as well as other characteristics such as their
academic standing and reputation for helpfulness, see e.g. Colander (2005)
and Barnes et al. (2010)). Given that advisors should have a comparative
advantage in transmitting knowledge in their own fields, we would generally
expect a high degree of affinity between the academic subfields of advisors and
advisees. We find that this is only partially true. We document that it is com-
mon for advisees to work in different fields from those of their advisors. This
intergenerational divergence in research interests has some interesting features
and varies across fields in meaningful ways. First, similarity in fields is com-
mon when the advisors work more on average in relatively large fields. Perhaps
more importantly, the degree of field overlap between advisor and advisee is
also strongly influenced by the productivity of the fields in which the advisor
is working. Finally, advisees who do not share their main field with their ad-
visors are more likely to work in fields with a higher demand for new assistant
professors. Taken together, these facts are consistent with the hypothesis that
advisors care about supporting the career of their advisees even if that means
a smaller influence of their own fields. An additional important finding is that
larger fields (more productive and exhibiting more intergenerational field sim-
ilarity) exhibit more cooperation among researchers, which is consistent with
complementarities between socialization and productive efforts as in Cabrales
et al. (2011) and Albornoz et al. (2016).
2 Data
We extracted data from three main sources. First, we used the RePEc Geneal-
ogy project to construct a data set of advisors and advisees for all cohorts from
1980 to 2014. Second, we web scraped information on every research paper by
the authors listed in the RePEc Genealogy project from the IDEAS-RePEc
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website. We then used the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification
codes on each research paper to associate an author with a field vector1, where
we define a field as a one digit JEL classifier, and allow authors to work in mul-
tiple fields. Finally, we construct measures of coauthorship using data we web
scraped from CollEc.2 Our final data set consists of 7950 researchers, 5990
advisor-advisee pairs and include information on all their papers, advisors,
students and coauthors.
3 Patterns of intergenerational transmission
of research topics
To explore the patterns of “intergenerational” field mobility, we first define a
measure of research overlap between advisors and advisees, which resembles
closely the index presented by Fafchamps et al. (2010). We use the one digit
JEL field vector described above to construct a cosine similarity measure of
field overlap between an advisor i and an advisee j,
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where xif is the proportion of 1 digit JEL field mentions for author i that
correspond to the JEL field f . Note that this is a continuous measure that
ranges from 0 (if i and j do not work on any paper in the same field) to 1 (if
i and j wrote in exactly the same fields and in exactly the same proportion).
In Table 1 we can see that the average field overlap between advisors and
1More specifically, we conducted the analysis as follows: we added up for each author all
the JEL identifiers at the uppermost level (a single letter without numbers) for every paper
she had registered in IDEAS. Then, for every individual author, we constructed a vector
with the sum of all of the JEL information contained in her papers, divided by field. For
example, if the author has three papers registered in IDEAS classified as A1, B2 and B31
according to the JEL, a second paper classified as B4 and B21, and the third getting C1
and A as classification, then we obtained the following vector of JEL fields: (2, 2, 1, 0, ...,
0), because she has 2 papers corresponding to A category, two papers in field B and another
paper classified as C.
2A RePEc service of rankings by co-authorship centrality for authors registered in the
RePEc Author Service.
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advisees is positive and significantly greater than zero at a 1% level (one-
tailed t-test). We then compare this to the average field overlap between two
authors, calculated by taking a random sample of one million author pairs and
calculating the average measure of cosine similarity for this random selection3.
As can be seen in Table 1, advisor-advisee pairs are clearly more similar in
terms of field choices than the average population. This is probably capturing
the fact that students often select advisors working in the fields that they are
interested in, and therefore are relatively biased towards choosing the same
fields4. However, the main point of interest in this paper is the fact that we
do observe that the similarities between advisors and advisees are low and, as
we show below, they vary in a meaningful way across fields.
Table 1: Average Field Similarity
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Advisor-advisee ωij 0.443*** 0.187 5990
Random sample ωij 0.295 0.251 1 million
Summary statistics for advisor-advisee ωij and population ωij (estimated with a random
sample of 1 million author pairs). A one-tailed t-test was performed on both means. *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
We then calculate for each advisor a measure of “weighted average field
size” as
si =
∑
f
xifSf
where Sf is measured as the number of authors with at least one article in
field f :
Sf =
∑
i
Ixif>0.
3We also tried selecting a sample of 100,000 and two million pairs and the results were
identical up to the first 6 digits.
4In an alternative analysis, we assign a main field to each author (the one digit JEL code
with the largest value in the field vector) and show that advisees tend to be biased towards
working in the same main field as their advisor, relative to our general sample of authors.
These results are available upon request.
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Table 2: Field similarity, Field Size and Demand
Field overlap ( ωij)
(1) (2)
Weighted size (si) 0.073
(0.005)***
Weighted demand (di) 0.655
(0.095)***
constant 0.186 0.386
(0.016)*** (0.008)***
R2 0.05 0.01
N 5,990 5,990
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
With these two measures, we can estimate the relationship between the
advisor-advisee cosine similarity measure of field overlap and the weighted
average field size of the advisor. Column 1 in Table 2 shows that there is a
positive and significant relation between the advisor’s weighted average field
size5 and the level of field similarity between advisors and advisees. This
observation leads to:
Empirical Observation 1. Intergenerational field mobility is less likely to
occur when advisors work relatively more in larger fields.
A natural concern with Empirical Observation 1 is whether it is driven by
self-selection into fields by ability. In unreported analysis (available upon re-
quest), we observe that there is no correlation between field size and the share
of authors listed in the top 10% and top 5% IDEAS-RePEc average ranking
of authors for each field6, which we will use as a measure of average “quality”
or productivity at the field level. If the probability of being a top author was
correlated with unobserved ability, then this finding would suggest that selec-
tion is hardly a big issue. We can further mitigate the concern about selection
5This measure of weighted size was then divided by 1000 when we ran the regressions,
so as to produce a more legible coefficient.
6This measure is more thoroughly explained in the following section.
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by ability by running the same regressions supporting Empirical Observations
1, but restricting the sample of advisees to top 5% and 10% authors according
to the IDEAS ranking. In an unreported analysis, we obtain similar results,
which reassures us that self-selection by ability is not a main driver of our
results.
Another potential source of concern stems from the fact that each JEL
classification at the letter level has a different number of sub-categories. If
authors were in fact working in fields defined at a more specific level (for ex-
ample, at the 3 digit JEL code), and if more popular fields (defined at the 1
digit JEL level) were also fields with more sub-categories (at the 3 digit level),
then we might be observing more similarity in more popular fields simply be-
cause they also have more sub-categories, and therefore we would be missing
advisees changing their research fields but appearing still in the same 1 digit
field category. We can address this concern by controlling for the number of 3
digit JEL categories in each 1 digit JEL field, at a field level regression. Since
our measure of similarity is a continuous variable weighting all the fields at
the author level, it is easier to tackle this potential bias by (i) attributing each
author the field for which she/he has the largest number of publications, (ii)
estimating the probability for an advisee working on a field j conditional on
her/his advisor working on j (Hf ), and (iii) running regressions of that prob-
ability on the unconditional probability of this advisee working on field j (wf )
with controls for the number of sub-fields per field. Based on this estimation,
we observe a positive association between H and w, which is another way to
substantiate Empirical Observation 1 but controlling for the number of sub-
fields per field. Furthermore, we find that the correlation between field size
(number of authors attributed to the field) and the number of sub-categories by
1 digit JEL field, which turns out to be low and insignificant. Based on these
results (available upon request), we can fairly state that our results are not
mechanically generated by differences in the number of sub-categories across
fields.
To infer whether intergenerational field mobility is related to the appeal of
the field, we need a measure of profitability. As a proxy, we use a measure of
success in the PhD labor market for each field based on the Survey of the Labor
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Market for New PhD Hires in Economics published by the Center for Business
and Economic Research at the University of Arkansas. This survey collects
information on over 200 organizations, including the demand and supply of
new Ph.D.s by field of specialization, at the one-digit JEL identifier. We take
the total demand for new Ph.Ds between 2009 and 2012 by field as our measure
of appeal at the field level. We then construct a measure of weighted demand
for each advisor as the weighted average demand for new Ph.Ds in the fields
in which the advisor is active,
di =
∑
f
xifDf
where Df is the aggregated demand from 2009 to 2012 for new assistant pro-
fessors in field f . The second column of Table 2 shows the coefficients resulting
from the regression of wij on di for all advisor-advisee pairs. From this regres-
sion, we can clearly infer a positive relationship between the degree of field
similarity between the advisor and the advisee, and the degree in which the
advisor works in more demanded fields. We can therefore state,
Empirical Observation 2. Intergenerational field mobility is less likely to
occur when advisors work relatively more in fields with a larger demand for
new PhD Assistant Professors.
The two previous observations imply that field mobility between advisor
and advisee (understood as a low field similarity measure) seems to be nega-
tively correlated with both the size and the demand of the fields in which the
advisor is working. In order to also say something about what fields are being
chosen by these advisees who are farther apart from their advisors, we use a
discrete version of the similarity measure. We define for each author in our
dataset their main field as the field for which her field vector has the largest
value7. We can then calculate a measure of “receptiveness” by field as follows:
we take all the advisees with a different main field than their advisors, and
then calculate the share of those advisees that are in each main field. In this
7If there are multiple fields with the maximum values, the author is assigned all those
fields as her main fields.
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Figure 1: Relationship between Receptiveness and the proportion of demand
by field.
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manner we can see how many “switchers” are received by each field. In Figure
1 we plot the relationship between “receptiveness” and the relative demand
by field8. This relationship is clearly positive implying:
Empirical Observation 3. The fields with higher demand in the market for
new PhD Assistant Professors are those that attract a higher proportion of
researchers working in different fields than those of their advisors.
Taken together, Empirical Observations 1, 2 and 3 are consistent with the
existence of advisors’ concerns about the success and productivity of fields cho-
sen by their advisees. We turn now to the question of whether more productive
fields exhibit higher or lower levels of socialization.
4 Networking and Productivity
In this section, we report evidence that connects productivity with authorship
interactions. We construct our variable of coauthorship as follows: for each
8In this figure we exclude fields A, P and Z as main fields because each one represent
less than 0.2% of the total sample, results hold true if these fields are included.
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economist in our data set, we counted the number of her/his coauthors, we
then also estimated the median number of coauthors by JEL main fields (where
main fields for each author were defined as in the previous section); that
is, the median number of coauthors amongst all the authors in each field.9
Table 3 displays the median number of coauthors for each field (column 1).
This measure ranges from 3.5 in Economic Thought and Methodology to 9.5
in Agricultural Economics. Finally, we construct a measure of productivity.
IDEAS-RePEc generates a series of rankings by author, from which we selected
the Average Rank Score.10 For each author, we define whether she or he is a
“top author” according to whether she or he is included in the Top 10% of the
IDEAS-RePEc of authors.11 Finally, we calculate the share of “top authors”
for each JEL field as a measure of field productivity (Table 3, column 2).12
Based on Figure 4, we examine whether there is a relationship between the
median number of coauthors and the share of “top authors”. Clearly, there is
a positive association that we summarize as:
Empirical Observation 4. More productive fields are characterized by higher
levels of coauthorship.
A potential bias in our results may emerge if field popularity varied over
time, so that some fields have on average younger researchers than others. If
career length were positively related to both coauthorship and to a researchers
probability of being in the IDEAS top 10% ranking, then we would be facing
a confounding factor. In order to address this concern, we run the regres-
9The median instead of the mean was used in order to mitigate the concern that sub-fields
are highly influenced by some authors who are clearly outliers in the less popular fields.
10This score is determined by taking a harmonic mean of the ranks in each method, except
the first one (number of works), the best, and the worst rank.
11We also use a more strict definition of “top author” using the Top 5% threshold.
12Note that our data is biased towards “top researchers”since we are using a subsection
of all authors in IDEAS, because we are only considering authors who are also listed in
CollEC and RePEc Genealogy. In almost all the fields, more than 10% of the researchers in
our dataset are considered a “top researcher”. As unreported robustness checks (available
upon request), we use a measure of field productivity based on the share of published papers
in top five Journals (American Economic Review (AER), Econometrica (EMA),the Journal
of Political Economy (JPE), the Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE), and the Review
of Economic Studies (RES)) for each field, which was developed by Card and Della Vigna
(2013).
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Table 3: Median number of coauthors by JEL field and Top 10% authors by
field.
JEL field Median “Top Author”
Coauthors Share (%)
Economic Thought and Methodology (B) 3.5 14
Mathematical and Quantitative Methods (C) 5 25
Microeconomics (D) 5 27
Macroeconomics And Monetary Economics (E) 6 36
International Economics (F) 7 34
Finance (G) 6 42
Public Economics (H) 7 35
Health, Education, And Welfare (I) 5 21
Labor And Demographic (J) 7 36
Law And Economics (K) 4 31
Industrial Organization (L) 6 27
Business Administration and Economics (M) 6 18
Economic History (N) 6 32
Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth (O) 8 36
Agricultural Economics (Q) 9.5 35
Urban, Rural, Regional (R) 8.5 39
sion shown in Figure 2 but controlling for the average number of years from
PhD graduation for researchers in each field. Table 4 reports both the regres-
sion with and without controls. As can be seen, the association between our
measure of productivity and coauthorship remains almost unaltered with the
inclusion of controls. Interestingly, we observe that the mean years from PhD
graduation is in fact negatively correlated with the median number of coau-
thors, so that the relation between median coauthorship and field productivity
would seem to be bias our results downwardly. This is consistent with results
at the author level, where we find that coauthorship is in fact decreasing in
years from graduation. Both results are probably due to an increasing trend
in economics to produce coauthored papers.
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Figure 2: Association between the median number of coauthors and the pro-
portion of authors in the Top 10% in IDEAS ranking.
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Table 4: Association between median number of coauthors and proportion of
authors in IDEAS Top 10% ranking, with and without controlling for mean
age by field.
Median Number of Coauthors
top10 12.786 13.610
(2.722)*** (2.293)***
Mean Years from Graduation -0.191
(0.092)*
Constant 2.473 5.398
(0.915)** (1.684)***
R2 0.46 0.56
N 18 18
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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5 Concluding remarks
This note has documented trends of socialization and intergenerational mobil-
ity within research fields in economics. The results on intergenerational field
mobility could reflect that advisors might encourage and help their advisees
to invest in the more profitable fields; a fact that is interesting in its own
right that we interpret as reflecting advisors’ concerns about their advisees’
socialization and production fields.
When interpreting coauthorship as an observable consequence of socializa-
tion, this empirical observation can be related to socialization in networks more
generally. Our observation is consistent with the model prediction in Albornoz
et al. (2016) where more productive networks are characterized by more so-
cialization. It is also consistent with the empirical observations documented in
Currarini et al. (2009) that individuals belonging to larger groups have more
friendship connections per capita. The result nicely connects to a recent litera-
ture that has taken into account network effects in economic research. Ductor
(2015) has shown that greater collaboration leads to higher academic produc-
tivity. Medoff (2003) empirically evaluate the predictive power of several net-
work characteristics on individual research outputs in economic research. The
productivity of coauthors, closeness centrality, and the number of past coau-
thors are particularly relevant to infer young researchers future productivity.
Finally, our findings emphasize the relevance of considering intergenerational
concerns and network effects to evaluate the effect of socialization on academic
performance.13
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